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Social Security and the Decision to Retire
ABSTRACT
This study examines empirically whether socialsecurity influences
the retirement decisions of individuals. The frameworkfor this study is
the life—cycle model of individual behavior. Thelife—cycle model shows
that there are two main ways in which socialsecurity can affect behavior.
One way is through the change in an individual's lifetimeincome that social
security can bring about. The other way has to do with how thesystem
changes compensation for work. Social security's income and substitution
effects are included in a model for examining retirementdecisions. This
model is based on the model of labor forceparticipation that has become
standard in the literature on labor supply. The data used in thisstudy
come from the Social Security Administration and are particularly well
suited for this study. Retirement models are estimatedseparately for
samples of 62—64 and 65—70 year old men. The empirical resultssupport the
conclusion that social security influences the decisionto retire. The
magnitude of behavioral responses to changes in socialsecurity benefits
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I.Introduction
Socialsecurity is the major sourceofincome support for
retirementinthe U.S.; the program paid benefits ofapproximately 105
billion in 1980.1 There are two broad viewson how people are affected
by social security. One view emphasizes thatpeople retire because of
poor health or because they are otherwise forced out of theirjobs and
that social security benefitscompensate in part for the concomitant
reduction in earnings. This view stresses theinsurance aspect of
social security with the implication that socialsecurity has little or
no effect on when people retire.2 Another view basedon economic models
of labor supply allows for a potential effectof social security on
retirement. This economic view has receivedconsiderable theoretical3
and empirical4 attention in recentyears. Determining whether social
security influences individual behavior, especiallyretirement, is
important. Such information can be used to structure thesystem so that
1 Sources ofinformation on benefit payments in thepast and projected
payments in the future are: Bayo, Ritchie, and Faber(1978);
Petri(1980); Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statisticalppie, Boardof Trustees (1980),1980 Annual
2Ball(1978), Myers (1964).
Sheshinski (1978), Diamond and Mirrlees(1978), Hu (1979), Kurz
(1981), Crawford and Lilien (1981).
Campbell and Campbell (1976); Boskin (1977); Pellechio(l979a); Clark,
Johnson, and Sumner (1981); Mitchell and Fields(1981); Esposito and
Packard (1980).
—1—it does not distort individual behavior and is financially sound. The
purpose of this paper is to examine empirically whether social security
influences the retirement decisions of individuals.
Social security can affect both an individual's decision to retire
and, if he does not retire fully, his decision on how much to work.
Based on these two dimensions of social security's effect on the labor
supply, my empirical study of retirement has been divided into two
parts. This paper presents the first part which focuses on the
retirement decision and the influence that social security benefits can
have upon this decision. A companion paper (Pellechio, l981b) presents
the second part of my study which examines how much retirement-aged
individuals work when they do not retire fully. In this second part the
social security earnings test, a regulation that reduces an individual's
benefit payment when his earnings exceed a certain amount, enters the
analysis. The econometric problems posed by the earnings test require a
methodology for estimating labor supply over kinked budget constraints;
this methodology has been developed in Pellechio (1979b). The
examination of the separate effects of social security benefits and the
earnings test on retirement is an important feature of this two-part
study.
The framework for the empirical study here is the life-cycle model
of individual behavior. The empirical specification of the model allows
for testing whether the life-cycle model is a valid description of
behavior. The way in which social security enters the model is
presented in Section II. Briefly, what this section shows is that there
-2-are two main ways in which socialsecurity can affect behavior. One way
is through the change in an individual'slifetime income that the system
can bring about. Several studiesS have shown that thetotal amount an
individual can expect to receive from socialsecurity does not
necessarily equal what that individual paid into thesystem. In
somewhat more precise terms, thepresent value of the benefits that an
individual can expect to receive during retirementdoes not necessarily
equal the present value of payroll taxes paidduring his working career.
Any difference between these two present valuesrepresents a change in
lifetime income that has a potential incomeeffect on economic behavior
in general and retirement inparticular.
The other way in which socialsecurity can affect retirement is by
changing compensation for work. This can happen becausebenefits are
based on earnings and will in generalchange in value in response to
continued employment, i.e. delayed retirement.Any change in the value
of benefits from delayed retirement becomespart of the compensation for
work just like the moneywages paid at the time of employment.
Excellent discussions of this incentiveto delay retirement in order to
receive larger benefits in the futureare given by Blinder, Gordon, and
liise (1980) and Bulow (1981). Thisstudy represents, in part, an
attempt to measure responses to this incentiveempirically. The main
point is that by changing the compensation for worksocial security has
potential substitution effects on how muchpeople work. Social
security's income and substitution effectsare discussed in more detail
Pellechjo (1981a); Ferrara (1980); Orb andSchrejtmueller (1978); Leimer and Petrj (1980).
-3-in Section II.
The model used for examining retirement decisions is based on the
model of labor force participation that has become standard in the
literature on labor supply. This model uses two equations, one for the
market wage that an individual faces and another for the individual's
value of time or shadow price. The market wage equation is expanded to
include variables that measure social security's effect on an
individual's compensation for work. Social security variables that
influence an individual's shadow price are added to the shadow price
equation. The final alteration that converts the standard labor force
participation model into a retirement model is to define
nonparticipation according to a suitable definition of retirement. The
definition adopted here in effect implements the definition of
retirement that is implicit, in the rules for receiving full social
security benefits. With this definition the effect of these benefits on
retirement can be examined independently of the earnings test. A
description of the retirement model and techniques for identifying and
estimating parameters are given in Section III.
The data used in this study come from the Social Security
Administration. An important feature of the data is that it is possible
to calculate accurately the social security benefit that an individual
is entitled to receive. In other words, an individual's potential
benefit is known even when no benefit payment is made. This benefit is
used to construct the social security variables presented in Section II.
Details on the empirical specification of the model are given in
Section IV.
-4-Estimated retirement models for samples of retirement-agedmen are
given in Section V. The empirical results support the conclusion that
social security affects the decision to retire. Thereare significant
responses to the system's income and substitution effects and the
magnitudes of these responses are presented and discussed. The results
of this study and their implications for future behaviorare summarized
in Section VI.
II.The Life-Cycle Model and Social Security
Thepotential effects of social security on retirement will be
discussed using the model of life-cycle behavior.6 In the absenceof
social security an individual chooses a path of lifetimeconsumption and





6Twoexcellenttheoretical models of life-cycle behavior are given by
Blinder and Weiss (1976), and Heckman (1976). Versions of the life-
cycle model that add social security in a way similar to what is done
here are given by Feldstein (1976b), Samuelson(1975), Kotlikoff
(1979), andRu(1979).
-5-where T =numberof years of an individual's life
c consumption expendituresin year t
=wagerate in year t
labor supply in year t
R =yearof retirement
discount factor from year t to whatever year
defines present value
This simply says that the present value of total lifetime consumption
expenditures must equal the present value of total lifetime earnings.
The adjustment to equation (1) for social security entails reducing
an individual's earnings during his working career by the payroll taxes
he pays andincreasinghis income during retirement by the benefits he
receives. The lifetime budget constraint becomes:
T R-l T
(2)E cD = (l_p)wltD
+ BtDt
t=l t=l t=R
where Ptpayroll tax rate in year t
Bt =socialsecurity retirement benefit payments in
year t
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) can be
separated into two components as follows:
-6-R- 1
(3a) PVE= Ew 1 D =presentvalue of earnings t=l
R-l
(3b)PVTAX = Zp wtltDt =presentvalue of payroll taxes
t=l
Thesecond term on the right-hand side ofequation (2) equals the
actuarial present value of the socialsecurity benefits to which an
individual is entitled as a retiredworker; the survival probabilities
that make it an actuarial calculationare included in the Dt's
Thispresent value of benefits iscalled "social security wealth" and is
denoted SSW.7If SSW equals PVTAXthenequation (2) is the same as
equation(1) which means that social security does notchange lifetime
income.However, as waspointed out before (see n. 5),SSW does not
necessarily equal PVTAX. When SSW exceeds PVTAX socialsecurity has
raised an individual's lifetime income. Thelife-cycle model predicts a
potential decrease in labor supply on the usualassumption that leisure
is a normal good. This decrease couldoccur as a reduction in labor
supply in the years in which a person worksor a reduction in
"Socialsecurity wealth was defined and first calculated by Feldstein
(1976a).
'Whethersocial security can affect behavior is aquestion with diverse
answers. Crawford and Lilien (1981) show in a theoreticalmodel how
behavior can be affected by socialsecurity even when it does not
change lifetime income, i.e. when it isactuarially fair. In another
theoretical model with perfect capital markets andfixed labor supply
Barro (1974) shows that socialsecurity has no economic effects even
if it is not actuarially fair.
-7-the number of years of work (R-l). Of course, if SSW is less than PVTAX
labor supply may be affected in the opposite way, i.e. individuals may
work more per year or increase their number of years of work. The
overall point is that SSW -PVTAXmeasures the change in lifetime income
produced by social security and this change has a potential income
effect on retirement.9
Another effect of social security comes from the influence that an
additional year of earnings can have on an individual's present and
future benefit payments. The influence on present benefit payments
arises because an individual foregoes current benefits when he decides
not to retire. The effect on future benefits arises from the fact that
earnings are used to calculate benefits. To see these effects consider
the change in the budget constraint when a person works rather than
retires in year R:'°
Barro's (1974) theory of life-cycle behavior with bequests implies
that there is no lifetime income effect. Intergenerational transfers
would cancel any change in an individual's lifetime income that social
security might try to impose. However, Barro's argument rests on his
assumption that labor supply is fixed. This paper examines whether
labor supply responds to changes in the lifetime budget constraint
produced by social security. Information on bequests is needed along
with the data used here (see Section IV) to examine Barro's theory.
The results here do not refute Barro's model but do stand in
juxtaposition to his assumption of fixed labor supply.








+ E(B -Bt)Dt t-1
t=R+l
where BR =foregonebenefits in year R
B =thebenefit obtained in year tbyadding earnings
in year R to the benefit calculation
The term (lpR)wR1R denotes the individual'snet
earnings from working in year R. The last two terms inequation (4)
represent the two ways in which social security can affect the
compensation from work. One way has to do with the fact thatbenefits
are foregone in year R by working. TheBR term represents this
loss in current benefits. This loss reduces thecompensation from work
and as such raises the likelihood of retirement.
The second way in which social securitycan affect compensation for
work is through the influence that earningscan have on future benefits.
Excellent discussions of this point are givenby Blinder, Gordon, and
Wise (1980) and Bulow (1981). The issue arisesbecause an average of an
individual's earnings is used to calculate benefits.11Earnings in the
current year tend to increase this average becausethey are likely to be
'Thecalculation of benefits begins by calculating theaverage of an
individual's annual earnings fromage 22 through the year before
retirement. Only earnings up to a maximum amount in eachyear are
used. In 1972, the year of this study, the socialsecurity system
computed the simple average of actual earnings afterdropping the
five years of lowest earnings, i.e. no adjustmentwas made for
different wage or price levels in differentyears. This simple
average is the base for calculating benefits; in other words, a
benefit formula is applied to thisaverage to yield a benefit amount.
-9-higher in nominal terms, if not in real terms, than past earnings. An
earnings-induced increase in future benefits is denoted by
Bt -B
in the last term of equation (4). The present
value of any increase in future benefits constitutes additional
compensation for work and this additional compensation makes retirement
less attractive and therefore less likely. This present value is given
by the last term in equation (4) and will be denoted DSSW.
Both the influence of foregone current benefits and increased
future benefits come under the heading of a substitution effect in the
sense that they change the compensation for work and as such can change
how much people work. Compensation for work is decreased by the loss in
current benefits, _BR, and increased by any gain in the value of
future benefits, DSSW. Thus, the main point of equation (4) is that
social security has two potential substitution effects that work in
opposite directions. The variables needed to estimate these
substitution effects as well as the income effect discussed in this
section are included in the retirement model constructed in the next
section.
III.The Retirement Model
Thelabor force participation model developed in the labor supply
literature'2 is used to construct an econometric model for examining
retirement behavior. The model uses equations that describe an
12Gronau(1973, 1977); Hall (1975); Hanoch (1976); Heckman (1974).
10 -individual's total compensation for work and his value of timein
nonmarket activities or shadow price. Let an individual's marketwage,
w, be given by the following equation:
(5)w =X+ e1
where X is a set of variables measuringwage, is the vector of
coefficients for X, and e. is an error term.
1
As discussed in Section II, a person's compensation for workequals
his market wage and any earnings-induced change in the value ofcurrent
or future benefits. A loss of current benefits, denotedBR as
before,- reduces compensation and a gain in the value of future benefits,
denoted DSSW, raises compensation. An individual's compensation for
work, denoted v, is therefore given as follows:
(6)v =
clBR+ c2DSSW + w
=
c1BR+ c2DSSW + X +
e1
The coefficients of BR and DSSW should ideally equal -].and1
respectively. However, they are left open to empirical estimation and
given as c1 and c2 in equation (6);c1 is expected to be
negative and c2 positive.
—1]. —The decision to retire also depends on the value of an individual's
time in activities other than working in the labor market, i.e. his
opportunity cost or shadow price. The lifetime income effect discussed
in Section II arises because a change in lifetime income has a potential
effect on an individual's shadow price. For example, an increase in
lifetime income makes it possible to spend more time outside the labor
market and therefore raises an individual's shadow price. As shown in
Section II, the change in lifetime income produced by social security is
given by the difference between social security wealth and the present
value of payroll taxes. The number of hours an individual spends
working also affects his shadow price. The more an individual woiks the
more valuable leisure time is to him. So, as hours of work go up so








where SSW and PVTAX denote social security wealth and the present value
of payroll taxes as defined in equations (2) and (3b) of Section II, h
equals hours of work, Y is a set of additional variables that influence
shadow price, is the vector of coefficients for Y, ande2 is an
error term.
A strict interpretation of the life-cycle model implies that an
individual responds to the change in lifetime income brought about by
social security; Section II showed this change to be SSW -PVTAX.A
consequence of this is that the coefficients of SSW and PVTAX should be
-12-equal in magnitude and opposite in sign. These coefficients will be
estimated freely. Examining whetherb2 =-b1serves as a test
of the life-cycle model.
The definition of retirement used in thisstudy says that a person
is retired when his earnings are low enoughso that there is no
reduction in his social security retirement benefitpayment due to the
earnings test. In other words his earnings are below the amount at
which the earnings test begins to reduce benefitpayments -- calledthe
exempt amount. Let K denote the number of hours of work it takes an
individual to earn the exempt amount. In theterminology of the model a
person is retired when the shadow price of his time at h=K exceeds his

























LetDR be a binary variable that indicates whether aperson is
retired (DR=l) or not (DR=O). The probability of retirement,P(DR1),
equals the probability that equation (9) holds which depends on the
distributions of
e1 and e2. Let e1 and e2be
distributednormally with variances and
respectively, and covariance a12. In this casee2 -e1
is
also normally distributed with variance=÷ -
2a12.











The argument of F will be called the "retirement index" and denoted J.
Estimates of c1, c2, b1, b2, b3, a, andup
to a scale factor a can be obtained from a probit analysis of DR. This
is done by dividing a sample of individuals into the subsamples of those
who are retired, (DR1), and those who are not, DRO}, and maximizing
the likelihood of observing this behavior in the sample. The likelihood
function following from equation (10) that is maximized is:




whereJ. =thevalue of the retirement index using individual's
values for the variables.
In this way maximum likelihood estimates of c1/ø, c2/C,
b1/a, b2/a, b3/a, a/a, and /a are obtained.
It is important to point out that the above retirement model is
valid even in the presence of the social security earnings test. The
effect of the earnings test on the individual budget constraint is
illustrated in Figure 1. The social security benefit that an individual
could receive in retirement is represented by the vertical distance AB.
-14-Income
FIGURE 1





















WorkThe variable BR in the model is measured by this distance. As
Figure 1 shows, the budget constraint is divided into three segments by
the earnings test. On the first segment, points B to C, a person can
receive his full retirement benefit and earn income up to the exempt
amount without losing benefits. Along the second segment, points C to
D, benefit payments are reduced by $.50 for every $1.00 of earnings
above the exempt amount. This effectively reduces a person's wage by 50
percent and, as the figure shows, the slope of the budget constraint
drops in magnitude. Once benefit payments are reduced to zero at point
D a person goes back to receiving his full wage above this point. Due
to this increase in wage from 50 percent to its full amount, the budget
constraint is nonconvex around point ID.The overall effect of the
earnings test on the individual budget constraint is to make it kinked
and nonconvex.
The crucial feature of the earnings-tested budget constraint for
the analysis here is that the extension of its initial segment BC, given
by the dashed line CF in Figure 1, lies above the rest of the
constraint. In this situation when an individual's shadow price at
point C is greater thanhiscompensation for work there is no chance of
the reverse happening above point C.In other words, equation (9) is a
necessary and sufficient condition for retirement. This would notbe
the case if the budget constraint, because of a nonconvexity, did lie
above CF at some point. It would then be possible both for equation (9)
to hold indicating a decision to retire and for an individual's shadow
price to be less than or equal to the slope of a portion of the budget
constraint above CF which indicates awillingness to work above point C,
-16-i.e. a decision not to retire.
However, this problem does not arise
with the earnings-tested
budget constraint as illustrated inFigure 1,
and equation (9) remainsa complete description of retirement.'3
It is important to pointout that the slope of the budget
constraint equals the individual'scompensation for work and not his
wage alone. As such it includes the value
of any earnings-induced
increase in the value of futurebenefits. This additionalcompensation
could result in the budget
constraint lying above its initialsegment.
Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) focusattention on this additional
compensation and how it affects the
budget constraint. They find that
in some cases this additional
compensation approximately cancels the
implicit tax rate of 50 percent in theearnings test. A cancellation of
the earnings test would notaffect the analysis here; it wouldjust
imply that point C is not avery important point to focus attention on
and that K is not an important
variable. The important question that
Blinder, Gordon, and Wise raise iswhether individuals understandor
perceive this additional compensation
and change their retirement
behavior in response to it. Thisadditional compensation was presented
as the variable DSSW in Section IIand is included in the retirement
model that is estimated here.Given the data used in thisstudy DSSW
can be accurately calculated.By including DSSW in the empirical
specification of the retirement model Iattempted to find out whether
13 Because
the budget constraint has theabove.mentioned feature the effect of the earnings test atpoint C and above can be excluded from
the analysis here. This featureprovides the technical justification for the division ofmy study of retirement behavior into twoparts. The effect of theearnings test on the hours of work of retirement-
aged individuals is studied in thecompanion paper (Pellechio 1981b) to this one.
—17—the work incentive discussed by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise and in
Section II affects individual retirement decisions empirically. The
data and calculation of variables in the empirical analysis are
described next.
IV. Dataand Empirical Specification
Theempirical analysis is based on a rich file of data from the
Social Security Administration --the1973 CPS-IRS-SSA Exact Match
file.14 This file starts with the March 1973 Current Population Survey
(CPS). Each individual's CPS record is matched to extracts of his 1972
income tax return (IRS) and social security records (SSA). The sample
drawn from this file for empirical study here consists of married men
age 60 -.70who are entitled to social security retirement benefits.
The social security data permit precise calculation of the social
security variables mentioned in previous sections. The reason for this
is that annual earnings covered by social security and the number of
quarters of coverage in each year from 1951 through 1975 are given for
each individual. This earnings information is precisely that used by
the Social Security Administration to calculate benefits. Benefits for
each individual were calculated according to the law in 1972, the year
for which the CPS gathered information and in which retirement behavior
is being examined in this study. The benefit variable, denoted BEN, in
the empirical specification of the model equals the retirement benefit
14Aziz(1978).
-18-that the couple is entitled to receive basedon the earnings histories
of the husband and the wife and the allowancefor a dependent spouse.
It is important to point out that the calculationof this variable in no
way depends on their earnings in 1972. It is a potentialbenefit, not
an actual benefit payment, and as such isexogenous with respect to the
behavior in 1972 being estimated.
The benefit payments that the husband and wifeare entitled to
receive in the future if they retire in 1972are also projected
according to the law. Social security wealth, SSW, equals theactuarial
present value of these benefit payments. The actuarialpart of the
calculation takes into account the probabilities thathusband and wife
each survive to years in the future. In thisstudy the potential
benefit payment in a future year is multipliedby the probability of
surviving to that year.15 If the husbandts own benefit is under
consideration then the probability of hissurviving to that year is
used. If a dependent spouse benefit is underconsideration then the
probability that both survive is used. If a survivors benefit is under
consideration then the probability that thepartner who is being
considered the survivor survives and the otherpartner does not is used.
The survival probabilities used here are the latestavailable from the
Bureau of the Census.'6 These probabilities aregiven by sex and age and
'Theuse of survival probabilities in this study rather than life
expectancies as in other studies is an important difference worthy of
note. These other studies assume individuals live to their life
expectancies. I do not know how life expectancies could be used to
account for the contingencies discussed in the following sentences in
the text.
16U.S.Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Projections of
the Population of the United States: 1977 to 2050 SeriesP-25, No.
704, July 1977.
—19—incorporate improvements in survival rates to the year 2050. Benefit
payments in future years are also discounted at a real interest rate of
1 percent.
The present value of an individual's earnings and thepresent value
of the payroll taxes he paid over his working careerare calculated from
the social security earnings data. These variablesare denoted PVE and
PVTAX and equation (3) gives the formula for each. It isimportant to
note that PVE is the present value of covered earnings and as such falls
short of encompassing a person's entire lifetimeearnings. PVTAX is
computed accurately from covered earnings. Earnings and payroll taxes
in past years are converted into dollars ofpresent value, i.e. 1972
dollars, at the same real interest rate of 1 percent as were benefits in
future years in the calculation of SSW.
The social security earnings data are also used tocompute a wage
variable for each individual. This computation usesearnings in the
years 1967-71 to produce a variable measuring a person's potential full-
time earnings in 1972. In order to do this a limitation in theearnings
data had to be overcome. This limitation is thatearnings only up to
the maximum amount taxed by social securityare reported. However,
along with these earnings the data report the number of quarters in
which the individual had covered earnings during theyear. If an
individual earned the taxable maximum inany year a procedure developed
by Fox (1976) that approximates earnings above the maximum based on the
number of quarters it took to reach the maximum isemployed here. This
procedure is used to calculate full-year earnings. An approximation to
full-year earnings is also made when an individual did not earn the
-20-taxable maximum buthad less. that four quarters ofcoverage. Thus, the
first step in constructing awage variable is to use actual earnings and
quarters of coverage in 1967-71 to calculate full-yearearnings in those
years. The objective is to convert actual earnings whichmay depend on
labor supply into a wage variable that doesnot depend on labor supply.
After computing full-time earnings in1967-71, earnings in each
year are converted to 1972 dollars. This is done by increasing full-
time earnings in a particularyear by the rate of increase in average
wages in the population as a whole between that year and 1972.Finally,
full-time earnings in 1967-71 expressed in 1972 dollarsare averaged to
yield the variable used as the measure of a person'spotential market
wage in 1972. This variable is calculated for both husband (WAGE) and
wife (WAGEW).
The number of years of past earnings used toconstruct the wage
variable is of course arbitrary. However byconsidering using more past
years an important issue is raised. It can be argued that a person's
entire history of earnings and labor supply should be usedto examine
his behavior in any particularyear. An implication of this is that it
is possible to consider using allpast annualearningsto compute WAGE.
However, this would cause problems for a study such as this where the
objective is to examine whether social security influences retirement
decisions independently of other variables. Thereason is that social
security benefits are computed from a person's entire history of
earnings. It would be difficult to estimate an effect of social
security independently of other variables if the assertion is made that
these other variables include all the information thatgoes into
-21-calculating social security benefits. This would be the case if WAGE
were computed from all previous earnings.
It is important to point out that this issue arises in any
empirical study of retirement, not just this one. Consequently there is
an identifying assumption in this and any other retirement study that
should be made explicit. The assumption is that there is a difference
between the way in which past earnings affect current behavior and the
way in which social security benefits, as computed from past earnings,
affect current behavior. The form that this identifying assumption
takes in this study is that the wage variable is computed from the
previous five years of earnings, and social security benefits are
computed according to the law from the entire earnings history. In
other words, benefits depend on an earnings history that is longer than
that which directly affects behavior, and therefore can have an
exogenous effect on retirement.
Given a person's potential earnings it is possible to figure out
how his benefit would change if an additional year of earnings were
included in the benefit formula. This is done in order to calculate the
variable DSSW discussed in previous sections. DSSW equals the present
value of any increase in future social security benefits that can be
gained from working an additional year and adding another year of
earnings to the benefit calculation. Operationally, a person's average
earnings as specified by social security law is recomputed with earnings
in 1972 set equal to his potential earnings. The benefit that a person
would be able to receive based on this new average earnings at the end
of 1972 is calculated using the same benefit formula used to calculate
-22-benefits in 1972. DSSW equals thepresent value of the difference
between this benefit and the benefit he wouldreceive if he did not
work, i.e. retired, in 1972. Discounting in the calculationof DSSW is
done at the same real interest rate of 1percent used in the other
present value variables.
Table 1 illustrates the magnitude of the variablesdiscussed up to
this point. The table reports retirementrates, social security wealth,
social security benefits, and DSSW bypotential earnings (WAGE) brackets
and age groups in 1972. The definition of retirementis that a person's
earnings in 1972 are less than the exempt amount in theearnings test
for that year, which was $1,680. Theage groups in the table are those
over which the retirement model was estimated; resultsare presented in
the next section. The benefit is the combinedbenefit that the husband
and wife are entitled to receive. SSW is thepresent value of the
benefit payments to both the husband and wife. In thebracket where the
mean value of potential earnings of $8,967 for 62 -64year olds falls
the table shows that the retirement rate is.257, social security
benefits equal $4,576, SSW equals $80,830, and DSSWequals $2,275. In
the potential earnings bracket containing themean value of potential
earnings for 65 -70year olds the retirement rate is .695, social
security benefits are $4,508, SSW equals $73,143, and DSSW equals
$1,358.
Another variable in the retirement model is the number of hoursof
work it would take to earn the exempt amount in theearnings test. It
appears because a person's shadow price depends on how much he works.
This variable is denoted K and equals $1,680, theexempt amount in 1972,
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The mean of DR equals the observed retirement rate.
-24-divided by a person's wage. Since thewage variable WAGE equals a:
person's annual wage, K equals $1,680 divided by WAGE andmultiplied by
2080, the number of hours of work in a full-timeyear. Since the exempt
amountisthe same for everyone, K is really just the inverse of WAGE.
As such it does not measure anyresponse to changes in the earnings
test. Thus, K may be more properly regarded as a variablemeasuring a
nonlinear wage effect. If the effect ofwage were taken to be strictly
linear by assumption then the inverse ofwage would measure the
coefficient of hours of work in the shadow price equationas specified
in equation (7). An exact interpretation of K is notan important point
in this study. It is important to realize that thewage effect i given
by both the coefficient of WAGE and that of K.
Some additional variables that appear in labor forceparticipation
models canbedefined from the data used here and included in the
empirical specification of the retirement model. One such variable is
capital income, denoted KINC. The CPS data report capital income as the
sum of interest payments, dividends, rental income, andotherproperty
income. The IRS data report total dividends and the taxableportion of
interest payments. The larger of the amounts reported by the CPS and
IRSas capital income is taken to be KINC.
Other variables that appear in the empirical specification of the
retirement model are the husband's and wife's age (AGE andAGEW,
respectively) and number of years of schooling (ED and EDW,
respectively). There are also binary variables to denote race (RACE =1
for whites) and residence in a rural area (RURAL).
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-26-The means and standard deviations of thevariables appearing in the
retirement model for the twoage groups are given in Table 2. The
empirical specifications of the equations forcompensation for work and
































Estimates of the retirement model definedby these equations are
presented next.
V.Empirical Results
Thissection presents estimated retirement models for thesample of
married men drawn from the 1973 Exact Match file.These men are
eligible to receive social security benefits.They did not receive
public assistance income in 1972. They were not coveredby the railroad
retirement system. Their full-time annualearnings as given by the
variable WAGE described in the last sectionwere greater than or equal•
to $2000. These criteria represent anattempt to exclude any potential
behavioral effects of low incomesupport provided by programs other than
social security. In other words, attention is focusedon social
securityts potential influence on retirement decisions.
-27
-Estimates of the retirement model were obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function given by equation (11) using the variables given in
Table 2 for the sample of married males. The empirical specification of































where a equals the standard deviation of the differencebetween the
errorterms, e2
-
e1,in the shadow price and compensation for
workequations. Thus, probit analysis produces estimates of
coefficients relative to a. Table 3 presents the probit estimates of
coefficients.
Estimates of the retirement model were obtained separately for
6264 and 65 -70year olds. The results in Table 3 provide overall
support for the life-cycle approach taken here and the conclusion that
social security has significant effects on retirement decisions. As was
pointed out in previous sections, the life-cycle model leads to the
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for SSW and PVTAX should be
equal in magnitude and opposite in sign. The coefficient estimates are
significantly different from zero and have opposite signs but the
magnitudes are not equal. Nonetheless, the coefficient estimates for
both SSW and PVTAX indicate that social security has a strong lifetime
income effect on retirement. The difference in magnitude says that the
lifetime income effect of benefits is different from that of taxes. The















































-2 X LOG LIKELIHOOD 212.766 343.440
-30-imply that an increase in lifetime income obtainedthrough social
security raises the probability of retirement.
The estimated substitution effects of socialsecurity conform with
expectations. The benefit variable BEN measures the currentsocial
security benefit that would be lost if the individual didnot retire.
Such a loss in benefits reduces thecompensation for work and should
raise the probability of retirement. Thepositive coefficient estimate
for BEN indicates that this is whathappens empirically. DSSW equals
the present value of the increase in futurebenefits obtained when a
person continues to work and adds another year of earnings to the
benefit calculation. DSSWrepresents extra compensation for work and as
such should encourage work and lower theprobability of retirement. The
negative coefficient estimate for DSSW provides empirical evidence that
this is the case.
It is interesting to note that the coefficientestimates for BEN
and DSSW have nearly the same magnitude for 62-64year olds. The
difference in their magnitudes isstatistically insignificant. When the
compensation for work equation, equation (6), was specified the fact
that the coefficients for BEN and DSSW should havethe same magnitude
was pointed out. Although this should hold for 65 -70year olds as
well, it does not. This suggests that older individualsrespond more to
the substitution effect of a loss in current benefitsrather than that
of an increase in future benefits. In otherwords, older individuals
are more inclined to collect current benefits and lesswilling to
respond to the work incentive in the social security benefit formula.
-31-The magnitude of the effect of a change in a variable on the
probability of retirement is not immediately apparent from the estimates
given in Table 3.In order to calculate such effects it is necessary to




where J is the estimate obtained from Table 3 of the retirement index
given in equation (12), and f is the normal density function. J equals
the coefficient estimates in Table 3 multiplied by their respective
variables. Let Z denote any variable and bz, its coefficient
estimate, then the change in the retirement probability with respect to
Z is given by:
(14) P(DR=l) =f(J)bz
whereuse is made of the fact that f(-Z) =f(Z).
Equation (14) shows that the effect of one variable on the
probability of retirement depends on its coefficient estimate and on the
values of all other variables because of the presence of J in the
argument of f.In order to calculate effects of variables, J was set
equal to its value at the mean value of all variables (see Table 2),
except that RACE was set equal to 1 and RURAL, 0. The derivative of the
retirement probability with respect to a variable was then computed
according to equation (14). These estimated derivatives were multiplied
by changes in the social security and wage variables and other selected
-32-variables to find the effect of these changes on theprobability of
retirement. These results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that, based on the estimated retirement models in
Table 3, a $10,000 increase in SSW raises the probability of retirement
by .103 for 62 -64year olds and .108 for 65 -70year olds. This
result assumes that the current benefit remains the same. Suchan
increase in SSW could be achieved through an increase in thepresent
value of future benefits. Also, an increase in SSW has thesame effect
as a decrease in the present value of payroll taxes. This follows as an
empirical result because the coefficient estimates for SSW arid PVTAX are
opposite in sign. Thus the main point to draw from the effect of an
increase in SSW is that it measures the effect of a corresponding
increase in lifetime income obtained through social security.
An Increase in current benefits of $500 has a substitution effect
that raises the probability of retirement by .049 for 62 -64year olds
and .149 for 65 -70year olds. In this case SSW is held constant.
This could be achieved by increasing current benefits at theexpense of
future benefits. It is interesting to consider just the opposite, i.e.
decreasing current benefits while keeping SSW constant. A $500
reduction in current benefits would reduce retirement probabilities by
the magnitudes just given for a benefit increase of the same amount. A
decrease in current benefits that holds SSW constant is, by definition,
actuarially fair. Such an actuarially fair reduction in current
benefits would not result in lower benefit payments in total from social
security to the individual (since SSW is constant). However, it would
increase revenue for the system because people work moreyears, i.e.
postpone retirement, and pay more taxes into the system.
-33-TABLE 4
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN VARIABLES
CHANGE IN TifE PROBABILITY OF RETIREMENT
VARIABLE CHANGE 62 -64YEAR OLDS 65 -70YEAR OLDS
SSW +10,000 0.103 0.108
BEN + 500 0.049 0.149
DSSW + 500 -0.048 -0.061
WAGE + 500 -0.008 -0.021
ED + 1 -0.013 -0.027
AGE + 1 0.042 0.030
WAGEW + 500 -0.010 -0.012
RACE 1 0.062 0.300
-34-DSSW was shown in Table 3 to havea significant negative effect on
the probability of retirement.This result provides empiricalsupport
for the point raised byBlinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) that social
secuity law, in particular the calculation ofbenefits from earnings,
provides a work incentive. Table 4 shows
that when DSSW goes up by $500
the retirement probability decreasesby .048 for 62 -64year olds and
.061 for 65 -70year olds. Whether the change is an increase inDSSW
or a decrease in current benefitsholding SSW constant as before, the
idea is the same: retirement is
postponed when future benefits can be
raised by foregoing current benefits.
As discussed when K wasdefined, the effect of the wage variable is
not given in the coefficient of WAGEalone. Recall that
K =1680*2080/WAGE.As a result the wage effect is determinedby








where bWAGE andbK are the coefficient estimates for WAGE and K
in Table 3. Given the magnitude ofthese coefficient estimates and the
fact that the minimum value of WAGEis $2000, the estimated derivative
of the retirement probability withrespect to WAGE is always negative.
Note that •this derivative dependson the level of WAGE. This derivative
was calculated at the mean value of WAGE inboth age groups. Based on
35 -this derivative, Table 4 shows that a $500 increase in an individual's
annual wage decreases the probability of retirement by .008 for 62 -64
year olds and .021 for 65 -70year olds. The nonlinear wage effect
yields the expected result that individuals with higher wages are less
likely to retire.
Having K in the model to pick up any nonlinear effect of the wage
variable is important. An argument can be made that the benefit
variable is really just measuring a nonlinear wage effect that is being
transmitted through the benefit formula. A person's benefit is, in
part, a nonlinear transformation of his wage. However, the presence of
K alleviates the problem posed by this argument.
The estimated effects of schooling conform with Mincer's (1974)
hypothesis about the relationship between schooling and retirement.
Individuals who obtain more schooling are expected to retire later.In
the estimated models the coefficient estimates for schooling (ED) are
b
significantlynegative. A one year increase in the number of years of
schooling lowers the probability of retirement by .103 for 62 -64year
olds and .027 for 65 -70year olds. The estimated effect of the wife's
schooling is small and insignificant in both age groups.
Increases in age have the expected positive effect on retirement.
An increase in age of one year raises the probability of retirement by
.042 for 62 -64year olds and .030 for 65 -70year olds. Increases in
the wife's age raise the probability of the husband's retirement as
well. The coefficient estimates for wife's age (AGEW) are smaller. The
effect of the wife's age relative to that of the husband's is one-third
for 62 -64year olds and one-eighth for 65 -70year olds.
-36-The effect of the wife'swage (WAGEW) on her husband's retirement
is an interesting result. Thehighly significant negative coefficient
estimates for WAGEW show that higherwages for a wife decrease the
probability of her husband's retirement. A $500 increasein the wife's
wage reduces the husband's retirement probability by .010 for62 -64
year olds and .012 for 65 -70year olds. This implies that husband's
and wife's time are complements in household
utility.
The race variable indicates that whites havea higher retirement
probability. The coefficient estimate for RACE for 65 -70year olds is
larger in magnitude and more precisely measured thanfor 62 -64year
olds. These estimates imply that theretirement probability for whites,
holding all the other variables constant, ishigher than that for blacks
by .062 for 62 -64year olds and .300 for 65 -70year olds.
The negative coefficient estimatesfor the variable RURAL indicate
that retirement rates are lower forindividuals who reside in a rural
area. These coefficient estimatesare not precisely measured though.
Both capital income (KINC) and thepresent value of earnings (PVE)
were expected to have positive coefficientestimates in the model. The
reason is that when a person's financial
accumulation is larger it is
possible to spend more time on leisure inlater years, i.e. to retire
early. For 62 -64year olds the coefficient estimates for KINC andPVE
-37-have the expected positive sign. However, the coefficient estimates for
65 -70year olds are opposite to what was expected. Since it was not
possible to measure capital income and the present value of earnings
precisely in the Exact Match dataset, problems in measuring KINC and PVE
may be responsible for the unexpected coefficient estimates in the 65 -
70year old age group. These variables were not important for the
general purpose of this study. Also they did not have much effect on
the results obtained for the other variables that were the focus of
study. For these reasons KINC and PVE do not receive much attention in
the empirical results.
VI.Summary and Conclusion
Theresults of this study and their implications will be summarized
briefly. In the framework of the life-cycle model social security was
shown to have a potential lifetime income effect and two substitution
effects on retirement. A retirement model was defined by expanding the
standard labor force participation model to include life-cycle variables
that would measure these potential effects of social security. The
definition of nonparticipation implements the definition of retirement
that is implicit in the rules for receiving full social security
benefits. The retirement model was estimated using the 1973 Exact Match
file, a dataset well suited for this study.
Retirement models were estimated for 62 -64and 65 -70year olds
separately. The results showed that an increase in lifetime income
-38-obtained through social security raised theprobability of retirement in
both age groups. This increase could be achievedeither through an
increase in social security wealth or a decrease inthe present value of
payroll taxes. A clear implication of this result is that if thesystem
were structured so that social security wealth equals thepresent value
of payroll taxes there would be no lifetime incomeeffect on retirement.
Under such an actuarially fair system retirementrates would have been
lower in past years because socialsecurity raised lifetime incomes of
individuals reaching retirement age to date.
The results showed that social security's two substitutioneffects
work in opposite directions on the decision to retire.Larger current
benefits increase the probability of retirement. Alarger gain in the
value of future benefits obtained throughearnings reduces the
retirement probability. Given that the magnitude of thecoefficient
estimate for current benefits equals that for theearnings-induced
increase in the value of future benefits for 62 -64year olds, social
security's two substitution effects cancel in thisage group. The
estimated lifetime income effect implies that socialsecurity's net
effect is to induce retirement for 62 -64year olds.
The estimated effect of current benefits exceedsthat of the earnings-
induced increase in future benefits for 65 -70year olds. A plausible
implication of this result is that individuals in the olderage group
discount future benefits at a rate higher than theone percent real rate
used for both age groups. Consequently, both socialsecurity's income
andsubstitutioneffects induce retirement in this agegroup.
-39-It is important to note that if social security were actuarially
fair, social sedurityts two substitution effects would cancel by the
very nature of what it means for the system to be actuarially fair. In
other words, social security would have no substitution effect by its
very structure. As mentioned, it also would not change lifetime income.
Thus, an actuarially fair social security system would have no economic
effects on individual retirement decisions.
The results of this study have some interesting implications for
retirement behavior in the future. As mentioned, most people reaching
retirement age to date have experienced gains in lifetime income through
social security. Such gains were made possible for a variety of
reasons.17 However, social security has reached a point where such gains
are no longer going to occur. Workers reaching retirement age in the
next several years will be gaining little in lifetime income or breaking
even. Several studies (see note 5) have shown that younger cohorts in
the population can expect losses in lifetime income. Based on this
reversal of social security's effect on lifetime income, it is possible
to project a reversal in retirement rates in the future. Retirement
rates can be expected to level off and go down.
17 Some workers did notpay taxes in the early years of their working
career because the system had not yet begun. Even after the system
started some workers were not covered until later. When a worker
began to pay into the system the payroll tax rate and covered
earnings level were low. Also, as the system grew because of growth
in the population and extension of coverage to more workers, it was
possible to raise benefits with little or no increase in taxes. For
these reasons workers reached retirement age with a large increase in
lifetime income from social security that could be realized by
retiring.
-40-The main result of this study isthe empirical evidence that social
security affects the decision to retire. Ina companion study
(Pellechjo, 1981b) social security's effecton how much people work even
when they decide not to retirefully is examined. Bringing the social
security earnings test into the analysis isan important factor in this
study. These studies and future research withother data should
contribute to the economics of retirement.
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